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**NSC BRIEFING**

**25 June 1958**

DOS REVIEW  
COMPLETED

**LEBANON**

- I. Political and military situations stalemated.
  - A. Hammarskjold firmly opposed to bringing outside military forces into Lebanon—Un or otherwise.
  - B. His opinion stems from belief that adequate force from small countries could not be raised quickly.
  - C. He is convinced that he cannot stake UN's prestige and possible future effectiveness in the UN on Lebanon.
  - D. Despite his estimate of 5-6,000 infiltrators he believes rebellion largely internal matter.

II. Rebel push in and on Beirut appears impending.

- A. Rebel concentrations in Basta Moslem quarter of Beirut are reported largest yet.

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- B. Despite Hammarskjold's Cairo visit, UAR continues its support of rebels.

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- C. Kamal Jumblatt's Druze forces are infiltrating into and around Beirut in anticipation of big push.

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**III. Shihab continues his equivocal policy and is in contact with rebels.**

**A. He has made "deal" with Jumblatt giving Jumblatt free hand in areas dominated by Druze.**

**1. This arrangement not only insures Jumblatt's supply lines to Syria, but enables his forces to infiltrate into Beirut.**

**B. Camaraderie between Jumblatt forces and army troops prevails. Two forces conduct joint patrols along roads.**

**C. Shihab's attitude toward situation aptly illustrated when he was queried about his civilian attire recently. He replied that "it was Sunday."**

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**D. Shihab has promised Chamoun several times that he would start offensives against rebels, but does nothing more than producing "plans of action."**

**E. Rebel-held Basta continues to be lit by government-supplied electricity which is used to print out anti-government papers.**

**1. Government post office delivers telegrams and mail there**

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**F. Shihab told US ambassador that opposition would be willing to enter into "de facto" cease-fire until presidential election 24 July.**

- 1. Opposition would continue its anti-Chamoun statements and probably renew fighting if president unacceptable to them elected.**
- 2. Shihab claims his men need a "week in which to wash up and change their boots and socks."**
- 3. Chamoun disturbed by Shihab's suggestion, regards it as possible "sell out" to Nasir and as legitimizing rebel movement.**
- 4. Also would allow EAR to continue pouring in support to rebels during truce.**

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
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**VI. Hammarskjold reported much impressed by Nasir's "assurances"**  
**(presumably of intent to end UAR interference).**

**A. Felt if Nasir could take trip to Yugoslavia, he couldn't**  
**have too many plans for Lebanon.**

**1. Hammarskjold overly optimistic. Nasir was in Moscow when**  
**UAR interference began.**



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